According to Section 47.02 of the Texas Penal Code, gambling is a criminal offense. This means that, according to the law, it is illegal to make a bet on the outcome of a sporting event, game, contest or election for the purpose of paying out money to the winner of the bet. Harris County law enforcement officials insist this business model is the same as taking a cut of the pot, colliqually called a rake, which is forbidden by the Texas Penal Code. Under Texas law, a person who unlawfully allows gambling to take place in a building or on property he owns or controls can be charged with a class A misdemeanor. If convicted, he faces a fine of up to $4,000 and a jail term of up to one year. There is no general prohibition against game rooms in Texas, so long as they do not have illegal gambling devices as defined in Section 47.01(4) of the Penal Code. The Legislature has carved out -the socalled “fuzzy animal exception”exception to the definition of. GAMBLING PENAL CODE TITLE 10. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, AND MORALS CHAPTER 47. GAMBLING Sec.A47.01.AADEFINITIONS.

718 S.W.2d 682 (1985)

Ronald Gerald ADLEY, Appellant,v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 786-84.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.

November 6, 1985.

Free spins welcome bonus casino. Rehearing Denied February 26, 1986.

Melvyn Carson Bruder, Edgar A. Mason, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., and Karen Chilton Beverly, and Mike Miller, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant was convicted for the felony offense of gambling promotion. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 47.03(a)(2). Appellant pled not guilty before the court and the court, based upon stipulated evidence, found appellant guilty and assessed a three year prison term, probated. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in a published opinion. Adley v. State, 675 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.App. 5th 1984). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in two respects.

Specifically, appellant alleges that the trial court reversibly erred in failing to grant his motion to quash wherein he alleged that the statutory language of 'receiving a bet' was vague and that the allegation that he received a bet was subject to varied interpretation, thereby failing to give him requisite notice. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, but because we believe that § 47.03(a)(2) is unconstitutionally *683 vague and ambiguous, we find it unnecessary to reach that issue. We will reverse the court of appeals.

The court of appeals specifically held that § 47.03(a)(2), supra was not unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. That court relied upon Powell v. State, 624 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.App.Beaumont, no pet.) The holding in Powell, supra can be characterized as dicta since the defendant was not charged with a violation of § 47.03(a)(2). We do not find the Beaumont Court of Appeals holding in Powell persuasive, nor is it controlling on this Court.[1]

The claim presented here centers upon a comparison of V.T.C.A. Penal Code § 47.02(a)(1) and § 47.03(a)(2). Appellant claims that the conduct of 'receiving a bet,' prohibited in § 47.03(a)(2) as a felony, and the conduct of 'making a bet' prohibited in § 47.02(a)(1) as a misdemeanor, are functionally the same conduct. He contends an individual cannot determine whether his conduct constitutes a felony or a misdemeanor, thereby rendering the statute void. Appellant argues that, in order to avoid such a conclusion, this Court should interpret § 47.03(a)(2) as requiring at least three parties to the transaction, thereby distinguishing § 47.02(a)(1), which only requires two parties. We cannot accept appellant's argument that § 47.03(a)(2) requires three parties; we believe such an interpretation defies logic and ignores legislative intent. Nonetheless, we believe the legislature has failed to sufficiently define the conduct of 'receiving a bet' so as to limit law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting only the professional, exploitive gambler under § 47.03 (a)(2).

This Court has not previously addressed the issue appellant raises. We have held that an indictment charging commission of conduct prohibited by § 47.03(a)(2) must allege the means used in receiving or recording a bet. Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Furthermore, in Smith v. State, 658 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) we held that a defendant was entitled to sufficient facts to give him precise notice of the offense for which he is charged. We also specifically refused to rule on the constitutionality of 'making a bet', § 47.02(a)(1) and 'receiving a bet', § 47.03(a)(2). We believe the time has come for this determination.

In 1974, the Texas Legislature enacted the Texas Penal Code, and in doing so, made various changes in the law pertaining to gambling. Prior to 1974, the Penal Code criminalized gambling in separate and distinct offenses for all the various forms of gambling.[2] The statutes were confusing to say the least. In enacting Chapter 47 of the new Code, the legislature sought to simplify the law.[3] More importantly, the legislature, for the first time, sought to decriminalize social gambling and provide minimal penalties for the individual who utilized the services of the professional gambler. See generally practice commentary to Chapter 47, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 47.01, et seq.

In pertinent part, the statutes provide as follows:

'47.01 Definitions

'In this chapter:

'(1) `Bet' means an agreement that, dependent on chance even though accompanied *684 by some skill, one stands to win or lose something of value..

'..

'47.02 Gambling

'(a) A person commits an offense if he:

'(1) makes a bet on the partial or final result of a game or contest or on the performance of a participant in a game or contest;

'..

'(b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section[4] that:

'(1) the actor engaged in gambling in a private place;

'(2) no person received any economic benefit other than personal winnings; and

'(3) except for the advantage of skill or luck, the risks of losing and the chance of winning were the same for participants.

'(c) An offense under this section is a Class C. misdemeanor.

'..

'Section 47.03 Gambling Promotion.

'(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly does any of the following acts:

'..

'(2) receives, records, or forwards a bet or offer to bet; Map of mgm casino springfield ma.

Casio graph 35 e occasion. '..

'(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the 3rd degree.'

Illegal gambling texas penal code aggravated

The Texas Legislature, in enacting the above-referenced Chapter 47, failed to define 'make' or 'receive' Therein lies the problem as the appellant sees it. Appellant argues that the notion of the existence of a 'bet' implies an agreement. An agreement necessarily involves at least two parties. Appellant relies on the definition of receive, to-wit: 'to come into possession of.' Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1977). Thus, appellant argues, that the receiver of a bet must receive an agreement entered into by two other parties. This notion ignores the reality of legislative history. To require the receiver of a bet to only be liable for receiving a bet made by two other parties is to limit the application of this section to a class of gambling that is non-existent. Moreover, we fail to see how a receiver of a bet made by two other parties can be classified as an exploitive gambler; the gambler whose conduct the legislature intended to forbid.

We believe appellant incorrectly isolates 'receive' and 'makes' without taking cognizance of what the intent of the legislature was in using this

Illegal Gambling Texas Penal Code